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Chapter 1 
 
Methods in Scientific 
and Religious Inquiry 
To have a method is to have a disciplined mode of "following after" (µέθοδος) 
truth, and in science and religion alike one intends an orderly approach to under-
standing, to be a methodist, but procedures in the two fields may seem very different 
and even incompatible. In this overview we will broadly assess their operation so as 
to see whether and how far they are related or opposed. Lest the diversity in religion 
prove overwhelming, the plan here is to consult mainly Western theistic belief, itself 
diverse enough, as it has developed in interaction with the sciences, which have a 
diversity almost equal to that in theism. Despite the pluralism, these two great 
epistemic lines in the West are cousins, at once kindred and independent. What 
follows is partly a description characteristic of science and theology, but, so far as 
I choose good science and good religion for models, it is a prescription of how inquiry 
there ought to be done, perhaps not always, but at least in the present state of these 
arts. 
The thesis that will emerge is that in generic logical form science and religion, 
when done well, are more alike than is often supposed, especially at their cores. An 
implication of this is that positivistic and scientistic views that exalt science and 
downgrade religion involve serious misunderstanding of the nature of both scientific 
and religious methods. At the same time, in material content, science and religion 
typically offer alternative interpretations of experience, the scientific interpretation 
being based on causality, the religious interpretation based on meaning. There are 
differing emphases in specific logical form in the rational modes of each. But both 
disciplines are rational, and both are susceptible to improvement over the centuries; 
both use governing theoretical paradigms as they confront experience. The conflicts 
between scientific and religious interpretations arise because the boundary between 
causality and meaning is semipermeable. 
1. THEORIES, CREEDS, AND EXPERIENCE 
The Hypothetico-deductive Method and Theory-laden Facts 
Whether there exists an overall scientific method is open to question, since the 
procedures of electronics engineers, plant taxonomists, and social psychologists are 
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so diverse. In a generalized way science mixes observation, theory, and inference, 
but these ingredients with their blending are more complex than at first appears, 
and not until something of this complexity is appreciated can one appreciate a 
scientific method and then profitably ask how far religious inquiry differs from it. 
Let us begin by saying that a scientist attempts to operate out of theory in an if-then 
mode "over" the facts. A schematic of this would find a theory (the hypothesis) 
arising out of the facts, followed by deduction back down to further empirical-level 
expectations, those then being related back to observations to confirm or disconfirm 
the theory, more or less, and to generate revised theory, from which new conclusions 
are drawn, after which the facts are again consulted (Figure 1.1). This is sometimes 
called the hypothetico-deductive model, but we are using a more expanded version 
of it than that phrase usually implies, and also noticing already that a theory comes 
to have a developmental history.l 
Such facts quickly become theory-laden. When the engineer reports that the 
current through the meter is ten amperes, or the zoologist discovers that the 
vertebrates are related to the tunicates, the larval notochord of the latter and the 
spinal chord of the former having evolved from a long-extinct hypothetical ances-
tor, their facts come within and are partially products of their theoretical frame-
works. Fabricated concepts and laws are used to trace and to classify natural 
events, and the facts so obtained do not come nakedly but rather filtered through 
these constructs. In the more theoretical sciences, those likeliest to affect cosmic 
belief, there is often a tenuous combination of speculative abstraction with sense 
observation, linked by hundreds of intervening hypotheses, as in the experiments 
that verify the time dilation of relativity theory by measuring the supposed decay 
of muons at high velocity, all translated into streaks on photographic plates and 
meter readings. The geneticist maps a gene by back inference from statistical 
phenotypic expressions. The biochemist decodes the amino acid sequence in a 
protein by observing certain colored stains or layers of material in an ultracen- 
trifuge. Molecular biochemistry contains highly theoretical construction of mod-
els of unobservable entities and processes—for instance, the lac-operon genetic 
sequence—to account for observed gross phenomena at great distance from the 
postulated microentities. Geology has become a unified science only in recent 
years, with the appearance of plate tectonics, but that supertheory stands at a 
great inferential distance from the immediate observation of fault lines, subsi-








Figure 1.1   The developmental history of a theory 
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ter readings from which are inferred prehistoric reversals of Earth's magnetic 
field. 
Even in the plainer bare world there are no centimeters, or calories, or lines of 
latitude and longitude; nor can it be Tuesday, 1:30 P.M. (EST), for these are all 
conceptual overlays on nature. The center of gravity in a rock is as much assigned 
as discovered. Still, one may reply, at least there are some evident natural kinds; there 
are tunicates and genes, there were trilobites in the Cambrian period, and Yosem- 
ite's Half Dome is made of quartz monzonite. But even these facts do not come 
unalloyed with the theories by which they were obtained. There is always some 
definition or decision about theoretical kinds in what counts as a tunicate, a gene, 
quartz monzonite, or the Cambrian period, as these are fitted into explanatory 
theories. 
The whole numbers may seem natural enough until we add, divide, and multiply 
by zero and infinity, and with some artificial innovation must define what these 
operations will mean. The point in science is to mix theory and fact appropriately, 
and not to pretend that they can be insulated from each other. The naked fact is 
mostly a mythical entity; facts are contextual truths. To believe in pure facts is to 
believe "the dogma of the immaculate perception." The "facts" are always to some 
extent "artifacts" of the theory. The "facts" are preceded by "acts" that set up the 
facts. The facts are seldom, if ever, immediately given; they are arranged for, indeed, 
chased down on long hunts by those armed with powerful theories. Even where 
theoretical concepts can be cashed in for observations in a fairly straightforward way, 
the cash-in rules come out of the theory, not the observations, and such rules can 
change in the course of the development of the theory. 
How such theories are originated, as distinct from their subsequent verification, 
has proved troublesome to analyze, and recently it has seemed that the context of 
discovery is more important, more interesting, than is the later context of justifica-
tion. Given a certain set of observations, what theory will fit them? In cataloging 
natural types or in formulating simple regularities one is tempted to say that science 
works by induction, a logic that leads in toward a concluded general principle from 
premised particular occasions. Here the contribution of the scientist can seem 
minimal, even though the law vastly overprojects what can be verified. But the 
generating of theories is more complex; the scientist comes up with models and 
abstractions, such as "lines of force in an electromagnetic field," or "covalent 
bonding," or "black holes," concepts that no doubt come by mulling over the data, 
but in which he also contributes creative hypotheses that require the stroke of 
genius. 
These initial ideas may come in the laboratory or at study but are sometimes 
reported to come in unusual circumstances. While dozing by the fire, August Kekulé 
dreamed a reverie of gamboling atoms and snakes, one biting its own tail, out of 
which the great chemist that night developed the chain-linked ring structure of 
benzene.2 Fred Hoyle regarded as pivotal in triggering the steady-state theory of the 
universe a curious personal incident in which he lost a screw or nail and could never 
find it, as though it had forever vanished. He reversed the experience to conceive 
of the spontaneous creation of matter.3 Albert Einstein reported that he initiated 
his relativity theory, partly at least, "in vision" late one night, and he greatly 
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emphasized the free play of the imagination, first and charismatic, only later to be 
put sternly to observational test.4 Hans Adolf Krebs, on the other hand, reported 
a long and steady step-by-step deciphering of the citric acid cycle.5 Both elements 
are present in Charles Darwin and difficult to separate.6 But if eurekaism is one 
extreme, dull inductivism is another. There is much inspiration whenever a fertile 
hypothesis is born. The logic of such inception has proved elusive; it involves 
something beyond either induction or deduction, and there seems to be no recipe 
for cooking up theories. This is perhaps necessarily so proportionately as it is creative. 
Revolutionary science is more chaotic here than is normal science. 
Verification and Falsification 
Crucial though the question is of how one gains a novel theory, the real test comes 
with its verification. Given a theory (T), what observations (O) follow? Here deduc-
tion is in order, at least in a broad sense; logic leads out from premised general 
principles to particular conclusions. In the mathematical phases of science, where 
one has formal laws and initial conditions, this can be exact and necessary deduction, 
but elsewhere it is less so. Atomic theory is only partially metric, and what could 
be deduced from the atomic table about the properties of as yet unfound elements 
was suggestive and imprecise. Often a theory permits the deduction only of a range 
of possible alternatives, and we must sometimes deduce in a weak, nontight sense. 
Still, a fertile theory will suggest new observations that can be made to check it. Here 
we often presume that our logic is paralleling a causal chain, that a law causally 
produces an observed event, the narrower sense of the hypothetico-deductive or 
covering-law model. But the principle here is broader than this, including whatever 
particular events or observational structures follow from general theoretical models. 
If T, then O 
Given: O 
Therefore: T 
Alas, however, this procedure commits the logical fallacy of affirming the conse-
quent, since some quite variant theory (T') might as well or better explain the 
observations in question, and the history of science is replete with examples of this. 
On the other hand, if the observations fail (not-O), then the theory is refuted, by 
modus tollens, an elementary principle of valid argument: 
If T, then O 
Given: not-O 
Therefore: not T 
Science then first appears to be caught in a rotten asymmetry: no amount of positive 
observations can prove a theory, while a single negative observation will destroy it. 
We can be definitely wrong, but only vaguely right! This asymmetry has led some 
scientists to concentrate on falsification, counting disconfirming instances as more 
weighty than confirming cases.7 
What happens in actual science is that positive observations do in some way tend 
to establish the theory, although it is difficult logically to specify just how. Again, 
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it is tempting to say that positive observations by induction render the theory 
probable, while conceding that this is never hard proof even in science and recogniz-
ing that the rational status of induction is flawed, especially so far as future predic-
tions from the theory involve a kind of backing into the future. Positive observations 
corroborate or strengthen the theory, although they cannot clinch it. We get no 
proofs; we get at best plausibility arguments. 
On the other hand, on closer inspection, those negative observations that first 
appear to offer hard disproof also soften. Theories are not tested purely and simply 
but in conjunction with various presumed or unknown intermediate factors, called 
auxiliary hypotheses (A), such as those pertaining to instruments, to irrelevant or 
absent influences, etc., and one can typically adjust for upsetting circumstances so 
as to salvage the central theory: 
If (T + A), then O 
Given: not-O 
                      Therefore: not-T and/or not-A 
Something has been falsified, but what? Some variant auxiliary hypothesis (A') will 
allow deducing the obtained observations while retaining the theory. Thus, the 
auxiliary belt of surrounding hypotheses becomes a protective cushion. In most 
practical and theoretical science we are reduced to saying: if T, then probably O. 
But then not-O no longer refutes the theory, especially where this is an occasional 
not-O. 
But it may be, of course, that the error is rather in the body of the theory itself. 
Newtonian theory predicted planetary movements reasonably well, except that the 
orbit of Uranus was irregular, and some astronomers suspected that the theory might 
be faulty. In a celebrated triumph of mathematical astronomy, John Couch Adams 
and Urbain Jean Joseph Leverrier introduced the auxiliary hypothesis of an unknown 
planet that was disturbing Uranus' orbit, and thus Neptune was found and Isaac 
Newton confirmed. Later, when aberrations in the perihelion of Mercury were 
found, Leverrier again suggested the auxiliary hypothesis of an innermost planet, 
Vulcan, whose influence was perturbing Mercury. But no such planet was found. 
Perhaps it was lost in the solar glare? Eventually the trouble proved to lie in 
Newtonian theory, and relativity theory came to replace it and to explain these 
discrepancies in Mercury's behavior. The problem is to know when to "put in some 
epicycles" to protect a theory and when to suspect the core theory itself. 
Every theory is held in the face of certain anomalies, margins of error, and so 
on. For so simple a law as that for the distance (S) traveled in a specified time 
(t) under the acceleration due to gravity (a), S = 1/2at2, the observations never fit 
the theory exactly, since the theory specifies a perfect vacuum. We also have to 
assume that there is no magnetism present countering the gravity, but to check this 
one needs a theory of magnetism and a measuring device built on the theory. In 
genetics and biochemistry one is constantly invoking as yet unknown genetic cod-
ings, enzymes, or repression or induction effects to explain departures from the 
norm. The theoretical imbalance in corroboration and falsification abstracted above, 
by the time it is emplaced in the practice of science, loses much of its asymmetry. 
At the same time, really stubborn disconfirmations are more unwelcome than 
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repeated confirmations are welcome. The structural asymmetry probably does mean, 
contrary to a certain sense of fair play, that in science (and in religion too, we shall 
soon maintain) you want to try to hit an opposing theory not where it is muscular 
but rather in the soft underbelly where it is weak; you ought to evaluate a theory 
(or a creed) more on its weaknesses than on its strengths. 
In more complex and partly established theory there are large amounts of 
confirming and some disconfirming observations, and one has to decide just how 
good the evidence is. That decision is rational, perhaps progressively corroborated 
as science settles into a theory, but often it is more discretionary and less tidy than 
is admitted by those charmed by an ideal of absolute demonstration. Every compre-
hensive theory has got to argue away some of the evidence it faces. Sometimes we 
do not believe the theory because it is not confirmed by the facts; but sometimes 
we do not believe the "facts" because there is no theory that confirms or predicts 
them and they go against a well-established theory that we have. We could handle 
this exception, if we had a little more time to deal with it! Meanwhile, an anomaly 
makes a poor logical fit in what theory we do have. Then again, experiments can 
be quite repeatable and quite wrong, where the conceptual framework repeatedly 
gives you the wrong result. You can step on a bathroom scale and get 150 pounds 
every time, when your weight is really 160 pounds. Hidden faults and errors are 
repeatable. Theories cast light, but may also put some things in shadow. 
Crucial experiments are infrequent, if indeed they exist at all. Hardly anywhere 
is there a simple verification or falsification, and the more massive the governing 
theory becomes, the less convenient these procedures are. The evidence for the big 
theories, which make any metaphysical difference, is never of the here-and-now, 
before-your-very-eyes sort. What counts for a good theory is its ability to draw 
together and make sense of the available experiential material, and in this the 
relationship between theory and observation is often indirect and interactional. 
Testing Creeds in Experience 
Religion too methodically mixes experience, theory, and inference. There are many 
disanalogies; often one finds notions of revelation and inspiration, and hence of 
normative authority, that cannot be easily reconciled with the procedures of science 
as just sketched. Creeds are not so provisional as scientific theories sometimes are, 
but more like settled operational assumptions (which scientific theories also can 
become). And there are many noncognitive elements in religion not present in 
science. Nevertheless, in a general way religious convictions develop in the face of 
certain experiences judged to be of ultimate importance, as of suffering or of joy, 
of sin and salvation, of the holy and the moral. On reflection by theologians there 
arise cognitive, theoretical notions suggesting certain universal spiritual laws or 
generalizations, leading to a positing of an underlying ultimate reality in and beyond 
the world that is sufficient to account for such experiences. God, Brahman, or śūn- 
yatā (Emptiness) is then used to interpret ongoing experience, and here, as with 
science but more so, the subsequent experiences are produced by and come within 
that framework of convictions that these experiences first spawned. 
The later religious experience provides a testing of dogmas, confirming or dis- 
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confirming them. The history of religion is strewn with abandoned beliefs, largely 
overcome by more commanding creeds or made implausible by new ranges of 
experience. To the contemporary religious mind, primitive fetishes and taboos, 
superstitions and sacrifices seem quite as quaint as (and perhaps a form of) primitive 
science. Only a handful of the myriad religious hypotheses of the human race have 
survived the sifting in experience that makes them classic (that is, verified in 
experience), and for that handful this durability increases their categorical element. 
Most earlier religions are extinct; a few are relict. Some will say that it is only modern 
science that wipes out old creeds, but this is not always the case. Sometimes new 
creeds wipe out old ones. Witchcraft and astrology were already prohibited in the 
Scriptures as unbecoming to monotheistic theory (although some belief in them 
persisted, per nefas). The Hebrews disenchanted the universe on the basis of mono-
theism long before science appeared—a finding that subsequently made science 
possible. 
Even classical theism, though once medieval, has nowhere become modern 
without dramatic revisions. One central element in the creeds of the Reformation 
churches is that they are "always reforming" (semper reformanda), that is, steadily 
improving their creeds in the light of contemporary experience that brings a new 
perspective to the foundations of the tradition, retaining only so much of that classic 
faith as continues to prove adequate, and that often in a reinterpreted form. The 
Roman Catholic Church has claimed an irreformable core to its creeds, but in the 
second half of this century this classical infallibility claim has been found by many 
who once held it not really to square with experience, and the Roman church is now 
undergoing hardly less radical revision than those churches that confess to a continu-
ing reformation. Religious belief has to weather a critical thinking out and testing 
out of the experiences that follow from its creeds, and theologies too are selected 
for their success over historic time. 
Religion does use the if-then mode of deriving consequences from its creeds and 
testing them in experience. In this, however, religious convictions cannot usually be 
cast into empirically testable frameworks. Simple events, such as planetary motions 
or chemical reactions, adapt well to watching with objective instruments, but more 
complex events, such as guilt and forgiveness, quantify poorly and are difficult to 
make operational. The instruments for their recording are subjective selves, and the 
hunting down of those experiences that are found when armed with religious creeds 
is a matter indeed of experience, of "going through," and not merely of observation, 
"looking on." In physics and chemistry, material things instantiate laws in a rather 
tight way, but living things, even in biology, often show only generalizations or 
statistical trends, hardly rejected by occasional counterexamples. Personal beings, as 
unique, rational, affective agents, can test religious convictions only experientially, 
not experimentally; existentially, not operationally. 
Low-level generalizations can sometimes be tested empirically, as with "The 
family that prays together stays together"8 or "Persons become more religious in 
adverse times." (Even if verified statistically, the underlying explanatory theory 
might still be contested.) Intermediate religious generalizations need personal ex-
periences mingled with observation. "Blessed is the man who walks in the law of 
the Lord" is the judgment that the moral life, as described biblically, yields the good 
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life, and a considerable number of persons have claimed to find this replicable and 
thus verified. The Buddhist claim that worldly life at its core is eventually unsatisfac-
tory (duhkha), so far as life is driven by uncontrolled desires, is perhaps only part 
of larger cosmological claims in the first and second noble truths, but this relatively 
specific claim is at least in some degree subject to experiential verification.9 
2. MODELS, PATTERNS, PARADIGMS 
Scientific and Religious Paradigms 
"Seeing" is universally "seeing as." We interpret what we see in order to see it. To 
tell what is going on, to see what is taking place, our observations are formed within 
gestalts. We see cows, not red patches, persons rather than bodies, love or hate 
rather than bare behavior. To notice this is not to deny that philosophically oriented 
observers can sometimes strip away the coordinating patterns and lay bare rudimen-
tary data. But such naked facts are abstractions artificial to normal experience, which 
occurs within natural and conventional categories. Routinely in science and in 
religion alike an event makes sense not merely as our senses register it but as it is 
found to be intelligible within certain established patterns of expectation.10 The 
understanding cannot see and the senses cannot think; cognizing and perceiving are 
wired up together. This interpretive seeing is sometimes thought to contrast with 
hypothetico-deductive science, but it is really in keeping with an earlier realization 
that observations are heavily theory-laden, that we come to see things as instances 
of types or universals. As these models become increasingly dominant, they become 
paradigms, and then we are able to give a better account of the revolutionary phases 
of theory overthrow while retaining our earlier hypothetico-deductive account for 
the evolutionary development of theories.11 At times some theory replacements cut 
clean from previous theory (the heavenly spheres of medieval astronomy were 
abandoned in Newtonian astronomy); at other times much is conserved, if reinter-
preted, in subsequent theory (Newton's laws are a special case within Einstein's 
relativity theory). Both clean cuts and conservation under radically new theories 
involve paradigm shifts. 
Paradigms are governing models that, in some fairly broad range of experience, 
set the context of explanation and intelligibility. Their holders wish to conserve these 
basic referent theories so far as they can by using them to interpret new experience 
or, in the event of counterexperiences, by introducing subsidiary hypotheses that 
allow the theory's conservation by peripheral adjustments. Paradigms are abandoned 
reluctantly, because they have hitherto been highly successful in structuring the data 
of experience. It has proved difficult in some cases to specify just what qualifies as 
a paradigm; paradigms have sometimes broader, sometimes narrower scope, and 
there may be a hierarchical interweaving of major and minor paradigms. But the 
basic idea here of a controlling patterned seeing does seem to characterize the history 
of science and religion alike. Prominent examples of dominant or subordinate 
paradigms in science include the Copernican and Ptolemaic astronomies; the fixity 
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of species and the evolution of species; Newton's absolute space-time and Einstein's 
relativity; mechanism and teleology; determinism and indeterminism; natural selec-
tion and orthogenesis; theories of phlogiston and of the ether; the taxonomic 
sequence of phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species; geologic uniformitarian- 
ism and catastrophism; the Paleozoic, Mesozoic, and Cenozoic periods; the wave 
and particle theories of light; atomic theory. 
Those familiar with the history of science will realize how much of its controversy 
and upheaval comes at periods of major paradigm shifts. Those engaged in its present 
practice will notice that many of these examples pervade their work as the assump-
tions that make it possible, while some of the overthrown paradigms now seem 
incredible. Notice too that one is not entirely oriented here by cognitive knowing; by 
following the techniques and methods of his predecessors and peers a scientist gets 
also a "know how" to do, as well as a "know that" something is so, so that there are 
tacit as well as explicit elements in our control by a paradigm. As Thomas S. Kuhn 
argues, a paradigm is a "disciplinary matrix" as well as a theoretical viewpoint. 
Religious paradigms are found prominently in creedal affirmations—for exam-
ple, that Jesus Christ is fully human, fully divine, one person; that God is love; that 
persons are made in the image of God (the divine character of the person); that an 
immortal soul resides in the body; that God predestines all; that Israel is a chosen 
people; that God (Allah) is, and Muhammad is his messenger; that the ātman 
(inmost self) is Brahman, the divine Absolute; that the conventional world 
(samsāra) is illusory (māyā); that the mundane world (samsāra) is the transmundane 
world (nirvāna) upon enlightenment; and that, short of enlightenment, a law of 
moral causation (karma) operates by which persons are reincarnated from life to life. 
Here again, a paradigm is not merely cognitive but carries a kind of skill at judgment, 
some tacit knowledge of how to work with it, from it. Some examples of paradigms 
in religion that have been entirely abandoned or seriously questioned by modern 
persons include animism and polytheism, the six-day creation, the fall of an original 
couple and the subsequent biological transmission of that original sin, the 
demon-possession theory of disease, the three-story universe (heaven above, earth, 
hell beneath), medieval accounts of purgation and indulgences, and (much revised if 
not abandoned) the verbal inerrancy of the Bible. 
Pervasive and Persuasive Characteristics of Paradigms 
A good paradigm has a maplike character in that reality is selected and represented 
through it so as to fit into a kind of basic picture: Newtonian mechanism portrays 
the world as a great machine; Darwinian evolutionary survival of the fittest portrays 
the world primarily as a jungle; behaviorism sees life-environment interactions as 
stimuli and responses; physics views protons, electrons, and photons as both waves 
and particles. God is a Father, Shepherd, and Creator. Jesus is the normative person. 
The Church is the body of Christ. Persons get "lost" and "saved." Life in the 
common world is driven by "thirst" (tanhā); essentially this world is a realm of 
"suffering" (duhkha) that is "empty" (śūnya), with one's fortunes in it the result 
of deeds (karma) in present or past lives. Imagery is present alike in science and in 
religion, and to become aware of the representational or symbolic character here is 
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to realize that these critical affirmations are maps rather than exact pictures of 
reality. Maps and models organize reality; they are never passive containers for 
experience, but they actively help us find organization in reality just because they 
abstract its structures. They tell us what to look for, what to discount, and what to 
make of what we find; and in this sense they are proposals as well as discoveries. 
In this sense, while the outcome of an experiment does not depend on the 
mental states of those who conduct it, the setup of an experiment, what outcomes 
are arranged for, does depend on the mental states (the theories) of the experiment-
ers. Arrangements can and should be made for outcomes that falsify or verify our 
theories, and there are surprises, outcomes that we do not expect or understand. All 
the same, only those sorts of outcomes can happen that we have advertently or 
inadvertently arranged for. We never catch black holes, DNA molecules, neuro- 
transmitters, or tectonic plates unless there is, preceding the catch, a mental state 
that goes looking for them. We catch patterns with a frame of mind. 
"If I hadn't believed it, I wouldn't have seen it." Physicists spent decades looking 
for the neutrino. After repeated failures, they prepared extremely elaborate experi-
ments (sixteen tons of scintillating liquid, 144 photomultiplier tubes, electronic 
apparatus 120 feet long) finally to catch it—inferring it from rare flashes of certain 
kinds amidst thousands of other flashes, arranged for with hundreds of thousands 
of dollars' worth of equipment, all taken two miles underground in a South African 
gold mine.I2 
On the other hand, when physicists got a theory that suggested that they look 
for positrons, they looked back to discover that positrons had been appearing for 
years in cloud chamber photographs and ignored as an anomaly. One can't see what 
one isn't looking for, even though the evidence is amply present. Often, what we 
find ourselves looking at depends on what we are looking for and with. 
As a paradigm proves to have high deployability it increasingly permeates all that 
we see, and thus a widely inclusive paradigm has a very low negotiability. We have 
faith in it. Like a creed, it has a categorical element in practice, although it is in 
principle a hypothesis. The belief that every event has a necessary and sufficient set 
of causes is virtually nondebatable, by some of its holders, as the basic assumption 
of all science. The precise status of this belief—whether it is an a priori claim, an 
empirical discovery, or a methodological hypothesis—is difficult to uncover. Recent 
physics has especially had to trouble over it, but scientists find it impossible to work 
without assuming that it is true sufficiently for the purposes of their research. The 
paradigm of evolution has rapidly become so entrenched that by its means biologists, 
geologists, anthropologists, and astronomers explain the origin of species, life, soci-
ety, landscapes, Earth, matter, and even the universe. In biological phases of evolu-
tion, the principle of natural selection has so come to govern accounts of why things 
happened as they did that adduced counterexamples are likely to be reinterpreted 
with auxiliary hypotheses protecting the principle that only the fittest survive. 
Gestalts, Anomalies, and "Bliks" 
This pervasive and persuasive tenacity of a good paradigm raises the fear that they 
sometimes come to be held "no matter what" and thus degenerate into an ideology 
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or a "blik"—a presupposition with which we view experience, spectacles through 
which all data will be viewed, with adjustments only in ad hoc hypotheses that are 
rigged for the sole purpose of saving the theory from refractory facts, and that 
actually insulate the theory from experience.13 This is perhaps allied with a law in 
gestalt theory by which viewers tend to complete a pattern regardless of whether 
it is completed in the observed reality. Hence, a source of error in theology and in 
science is a tendency to see causes and meanings, first in ranges of experience where 
they are readily found, and later to project them onto places where they are missing 
or incomplete. The theory that begins as a synthetic judgment about the world can 
get subtly transformed into an analytic prejudgment brought to the world, so that 
variant experience can no longer transform the theory but rather the theory trans-
forms the experience. A blik is a theory grown arrogant, too hard to be softened by 
experience. 
A humorous illustration is provided by the case of the deluded patient who 
complains to his physician, "Doctor, I'm dead." The doctor tries to assure him 
otherwise, with little success, and eventually exclaims in exasperation, "Well, dead 
men don't bleed, do they?" The patient agrees, "No, they don't." Whereupon the 
doctor jabs the patient's finger with a needle. As the blood trickles out, the patient 
sighs, "O.K. I was wrong! Dead men do bleed!" Actual instances of the power of 
a paradigm are more serious. After rejecting his earlier years in communism, Arthur 
Koestler reflected over its hold on him: "My Party education had equipped my mind 
with such elaborate shock-absorbing buffers and elastic defenses that everything seen 
and heard became automatically transformed to fit the preconceived pattern."14 
Reflecting on an earlier dominance of Freudian ideas in her psychoanalytic theory, 
Karen Horney recalled how "the system of theories which Freud has gradually 
developed is so consistent that when one is once entrenched in them it is difficult 
to make observations unbiased by his way of thinking."15 
In the judgment of many critics this conversion of a paradigm into an ideological 
prejudgment happens notoriously in religious belief. Belief in God begins in experi-
ence, perhaps that of goodness in creation, or of the numinous, or of sin and 
salvation; but it thereafter becomes transformed into a blik, which is held by 
introducing ad hoc revisions so as to allow no evidence to contradict the theory. All 
good paradigms are self-serving, no doubt, but the trouble arises when they brain-
wash us. Still, in less fanatical religion criticism is as much encouraged as it is in 
science and often is as telling. In both fields doubts arise as a result of experience, 
and these doubts are the first steps toward revised and improved theories and creeds. 
We do have an innate thirst to complete an explanation, and our tendency to 
hold on to available explanations and to press them as far as possible is as often 
fruitful as it is misleading. What one wants and expects in a fecund paradigmatic 
theory is massive explanatory power, a capacity to be deployed into ever-widening 
ranges of experience. A good paradigm can eat up and digest its competitors, and 
often absorbs and continues the explanatory power that opposing accounts once had. 
The paradox of a paradigm, whether in science or in religion, is that the better it 
is, the longer it survives, the more its resilience, the closer we probably are to the 
truth, and the more we ought to hang on to it, because it is to be expected that the 
nearer we are to the truth, the harder a theory will be to overthrow. The ultimate 
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theory will, of course, be unfalsifiable anywhere in practice, because it is entirely 
true! But just this element of trust that is well justified makes it harder to get a wedge 
of doubt in, to seek truth in unlikely directions, and to face up to an epistemic crisis. 
There is a sense in which one needs both to seek disconfirmations and to distrust 
them. 
One does need ever to beware of an ideology, that is, having one's logic (logos) 
so controlled by a form (idea) as to be oblivious of empirical and experiential input, 
so that this input is neither supportive nor constitutive of the theory, nor any longer 
able to reform it. The first part of being reasonable is to hold on to whatever logic 
you have, conserving a tradition, entering a paradigm, appreciating the best sense 
that can be made of the phenomena to this point. One keeps an inherited truth so 
long as it yields clarity without arrogance. The second part, more chaotic and 
threatening, is to know when to give up the old, to launch into the new. One needs 
to be able to recognize the kind of exception to a rule that signals the end of the 
rule. This is the hardest part, because there is no precedent for it, so far as it is a 
genuinely creative step, although of course unprecedented steps have often been 
taken in the past. 
The operation of paradigms is usefully, but oversimply, illustrated by the young 
lady-old hag reversible drawing (Figure 1.2). Viewers do not see, except by artificial 
straining, just black and white lines and patches, hard data, but they see now a young 
Figure 1.2   Lady-Hag reversible drawing
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lady and again an old hag; and whether a certain line is a necklace or a mouth, or 
another is a nose or a chin, depends upon the gestalt. The viewer does not just "see" 
particulars; she "sees as" these are governed by the gestalt. In physics an electron 
can be seen as a wave or a particle. In biochemistry the conduct of a hunting coyote 
can be interpreted mechanistically or teleologically. Behavioristic psychology sees 
the self in a stimulus-response pattern; humanistic psychology sees the inwardness 
of a centered, creative self. Sometimes these paradigms are complementary, as is 
suggested by the reversible drawing here, but sometimes they are not. When burn-
ing came to be seen as oxidation, the phlogiston theory had to be abandoned. When 
astronomers came to see the movements of the planets as Copernican theory does, 
those orbits could no longer be seen as Ptolemaic theory had seen them. On a 
broader scale, science and religion provide variant grids by which the world can be 
mapped, but how far they are complementary and how far incommensurable is not 
easily discovered. 
Some of the subjectivity in the example considered here is offset by remembering 
that the acceptance of a paradigm is collective, not just individual, and that a 
paradigm is much argued over, sifted through, and tested out, depending not just 
on what one perceives but on one's capacity to persuade others and to retain 
community allegiance. A paradigm is intersubjective and must command a commu-
nity. The example is also too static, in that drawings have no dynamism. Theories 
and creeds grow and mature, and these epistemic gestalts replace one another in 
historical succession, so that we have in reality not a frozen picture but a motion 
picture, a story, a living narrative alike in the development of science and religion. 
Older theory and creed are sometimes dissolved, judged incoherent, and forgotten, 
but they are sometimes reallocated and retained under a transformed gestalt. Thus, 
the past in science and in religion is partly discounted and partly recounted as an 
earlier, juvenile chapter in an ongoing narrative now become more sophisticated. 
The major religious systems offer diverse creeds through which the significance 
of life in the world may be viewed. But in attempting to appreciate them there is 
often considerable, if not insurmountable, difficulty in making that gestalt switch 
which occurs so easily in the lady-hag drawing. This difference arises because the 
viewing sensitivities of beholders depend on their behavior, experience, and charac-
ter. Further, these gestalts may overlap in part but be ultimately incommensurable. 
The Theravada Buddhist and the Christian concur in seeing life as something sacred 
and to be reverenced, but they disagree over whether to see the world as the creation 
of a personal Cod or as a fluid matrix of dependent origination. 
The complexity of gaining and defending a religious view can be suggested by 
another drawing, that of a black-and-white Rorschach picture that contains hid-
den the figure of a bearded man somewhat like traditional pictures of Jesus (Fig-
ure 1.3). The viewer may have to study the picture to detect this pattern, and 
even then will puzzle over whether it is really there or just an illusion. Still, when 
one has seen it, the portrait tends to govern what one sees there afterward. 
Christians are able to see the mystical presence of Jesus hidden in certain ranges 
of experience, while unbelievers often cannot make sense of the same ranges of 
experience, or see them under some other paradigm. The gestalt with the hidden 











Figure 1.3   The Jesus gestalt 
Christ figure here is ambiguous and easily dismissed, but in actual Christian life 
this hidden presence is often not so easily discounted. It is as though by moral 
and spiritual experience one's resolving power in the drawing could be sharpened, 
intense and sharper, so that the believer and unbeliever still could see the same 
gross shapes but attach different weights and intensities to them. Thus, the be-
liever would find more confirmation, while the unbeliever might remain puzzled 
before equivocal experience. What one is willing to tolerate as static or noise— 
the meaningless blotches in the background—depends greatly on developed sen-
sitivities. This points up the participatory nature of religion, increased over that 
in science, which later we have to examine. 
In paleoanthropology many anthropoid skulls, which are often partial or in 
fragments requiring much construction, have been recovered. The brain capacity of 
these fossil skulls increases with geological time (Figure 1.4). This tends to support 
the prevailing view that human intelligence evolved out of prehuman forms, through 
several stages of Australopithecus (gracile, robust, and perhaps habiline), with a 
brain capacity of about 500 cc, reaching Pithecanthropus, about 1,000 cc, and later 
Neanderthal man, 1,500 cc, more or less. But there is one anomalous skull, known 
as ER-1470, which is removed from the rest, with much greater cranial capacity than 
the theory allows. What an anthropologist, using his best judgment across all the 
data, has to decide is what sort of flier, fluke, or hoax ER-1470 is and whether 
revision in the main theory is called for. 





















Figure 1.4  Evolution based on cranial capacities (Adapted from J. B. Birdsell, 
Human Evolution, 2d ed. [Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1975], p. 337) 
In the gospel accounts hundreds of deeds and sayings of Jesus are preserved, 
written down some years afterward. To some extent these were reshaped by the 
mind of the early church; to some extent they faithfully portray the historical Jesus. 
In the Christian mind these portraits warrant viewing him as a perfect human, and 
Jesus has been a principal, if not the principal, ideal of moral and spiritual character 
in the Western world. There is also surviving in the gospels an odd story in which 
Jesus, traveling into Jerusalem while staying at nearby Bethany, sees from a distance 
a fig tree, precociously leafed out. He reaches it to find it barren, and, although it 
is not yet the season for figs, curses it for the lack of fruit. As he passes that way 
later, the blasted fig tree has withered.16 
On the face of it, and magical elements aside, this conduct seems intemperate; 
and what the Christian, using her best judgment across all the gospel data, has to 
decide is whether the normative ideal is a paradigm read into, or out of, the actual 
historical character of Jesus, whether this account of cursing the fig tree calls merely 
for an auxiliary hypothesis (such as that Jesus used the tree as an object lesson to 
condemn the fruitlessness of Israel) or for revision of the main claim that Jesus lived 
an ideal life, the anomaly surviving as a relic of a churlish side of Jesus' character, 
glossed over in the prevailing paradigm. In science and in religion alike, one needs 
to attend to all the appropriate facts, but the sifting of these into the most credible 
paradigm is never easy. Sometimes it requires the wise neglect of awkward facts, and 
sometimes those awkward facts that are initially dismissed later prove so serious as 
to overthrow the theory. 
16   /   SCIENCE AND RELIGION 
3. OBJECTIVITY AND INVOLVEMENT 
Science and religion both exist only as processes in persons. Although nature and 
God may be out there, science and religion alike are an informing of the subject— 
personal knowledge. Even if their respective theories and facts are in some degree 
objective knowledge, representing the real world, they are inescapably also subjective 
knowledge, information acquired, achieved, and processed by human subjects. The 
knower is never less present than is the known, since knowing is a relationship. A 
little reflection here will check the facile assumption that science is or ought to be 
entirely an objective discipline while religion is altogether a subjective one, an 
opinion usually ventured by persons flailing religion. It may also warn us to be 
cautious in divorcing the activity of scientists, who are persons as subject to involve-
ments as anyone else, from the structure of their science, at least until one has seen 
how far the latter can be factored out of the former. A participatory element is 
always present in science, although it is true that this element significantly deepens 
as the nature of the inquiry becomes religious. 
No discipline, certainly not science, can proceed without truth telling, and this 
at once introduces ethical demands. Not only must the investigator tell the truth, 
but also he depends on the honesty of colleagues and predecessors, since he can 
personally verify only the thousandth part of what he knows. Researchers occasion-
ally forge or color their reports, and if such dishonesty is not soon detected it often 
proves seriously disruptive, as with the Piltdown hoax in anthropology. A scientist 
trusts in the integrity of a community of scholars, and a decision about truth here 
is rather rarely by replication of experiments but ordinarily comes by judgments 
about whom to trust. That the world is round, or that a hydrogen atom contains 
one electron and one proton, or that time dilates with increased velocity, or that the 
sporophytes of cryptogams are diploid—these are facts in principle verifiable by work 
with firsthand data, but, since time and talents are limited, they are routinely 
believed as communicated by the honesty of others. 
Dedication and Universal Intent 
We speak of a dedicated scientist as we do of a dedicated saint. Being a good 
scientist is not merely an occupation, it is a calling. Although conscientiousness in 
the two differs in important respects, which will appear later, there is in both a 
commitment to an inquiry as genuinely worthwhile and as profitable enough to 
warrant the sacrifices that are required to pursue it. The pure scientist operates at 
a level of involvement unreached by those with applied concerns; like the saint, she 
is so devoted as enormously to invest the self in her discipline. No major accomplish-
ments in either science or religion have been made without commitment. 
Einstein remarked that science is driven by ''passion" no less than are the 
humanistic pursuits.17 This passion ought to enhance the capacity for judgment 
rather than to prejudice it. It is a passion at a level of involvement advanced from 
those with applied concerns for human welfare; it is a passion for truth intrinsic in 
the subject matter. All good scholars so love their disciplines as to hate error in them, 
especially as contributed by partisan bias. Like a judge who is intensely interested 
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in justice and just so disinterested before disputants, every intellectual needs dis-
interest fed by concern. 
Scientist and theologian alike seek what is called universal intent, a setting aside 
of private interests so as to promote the single-minded discovery of public truth, 
what is true at large and for all persons.18 It is odd to speak of "my science," yet 
permissible to speak of "my religion," owing to ranges of involvement that we will 
soon trace. But both scientist and theologian are humans making their way around 
in the world, and their self-understanding is hooked into their disciplines. It is 
appropriate to speak of a professor of science, equally with a professor of religion, 
and mean by that one who values the integrity of his discipline and pledges his life 
against the truth witnessed to by it. The witness of either professor is personally 
backed but moves toward public truth. All of the classical faiths would find it deviant 
for "my religion" to mean a faith intended for myself alone. Their truth is preached 
for all. Good religion shares with science an interest in truth independent of one's 
personal stake in it. It is equally bad in either area to start so proving one's private 
beliefs to others that this defense becomes primary, for then the discovery of a better 
theory for myself and for others is thwarted. Such willingness to submerge one's own 
achievements in the advancing tide of knowledge requires a steady humility on the 
part of theologian and scientist alike. Any who ask which discipline is the most 
troubled by dogmatism will find the question difficult to answer, and perhaps will 
conclude only that arrogant self-confidence is becoming in neither. A bare 
self-interest has to be overcome, the self's concerns aligned with this ultimate 
truth, which is in this sense objective or universally intersubjective. 
Science and theology alike are designed to correct anthropocentric error by 
inferring how things are in nature or in ultimate reality independently of the 
peculiarities of our sensory and cognitive faculties. Yet the knower always enters into 
her descriptions and cannot escape her framework. We cannot think without para-
digms, and yet we hope to submit to the facts, do this what it may to our models. 
Just this willingness to set the compulsion of the truth above a compelling paradigm 
prevents the latter from becoming an ideology; it enables our paradigms, self-serving 
as they are, to be self-correcting. Only devotion to truth can accomplish this; and 
so a willingness not only to give of oneself but to give up one's preconceptions and 
illusions for the sake of the truth—a determination to hear the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, come what may, cost what it may—is as characteristic of good 
theology as it is of good science. The reforming spirit in theology is just this 
insistence that a person must not get in the way of the truth, must not bias it, but 
hear it sensitively and entirely. 
Informed Judgment and Decision 
The foregoing virtues perhaps can be assigned to the climate in which the scientist 
works, and thus they are a part of his larger methodology shared with other scholars. 
But it might be contended that these have little to do with the content of his 
knowledge. Honesty, truth, commitment, selflessness, and humility in the scientist 
facilitate the inception and teaching of science, but they do not belong to the 
finished product that science delivers. They belong to the psychological matrix of 
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science but not to its logical structures. Even this makes them indispensable, but 
there are, we must notice, some areas where the immediate scientific judgments have 
an inescapable personal coefficient. 
Like religion, science can be communicated only to those who are subjectively 
prepared, that is, willing and able, to receive its claims. It can be appreciated only 
by those who value it, and this requires a joining of and an education into a skilled 
community. Science has its logic, often an impressively rigorous one, but that logic 
is simply not available without sustained study, critical interaction, and this is both 
psychologically and logically costly. Science is not so much objectively as it is 
intersubjectively testable, replicable only by those who live and work into its particu-
lar fields with achievements adequate for judgments there. This is a matter not only 
of access to a field but also of ongoing functioning within it, of depending on a 
community that can understand and criticize one's work. Only occasionally can a 
scientist work individually; usually she needs collegial interaction and even closely 
coupled teamwork. In science and in religion this dependence on a community 
differs in ways we soon will specify (there are confessional elements in religion as 
well as professional ones), but there remains in common an element of personal 
qualification derived from a corporate education. 
The criteria commonly given for assessing a theory are the extent of its agree-
ment with experience, its internal consistency, its simplicity, its elegance, its deploy- 
ability or interconnectedness with allied fields, its fruitfulness or productivity, its 
testability or predictive power, and the degree to which it provides a satisfying sense 
of explanation. In the application of these criteria a considerable degree of argument 
is appropriate, and in the metric sciences this may be of a computational kind. Some 
theories are eventually rather well settled into, but appraisal of even the simplest laws 
and theories always includes a scientist's larger judgment of what can safely be left 
out in evaluating a particular natural phenomenon. On the cutting edge of science 
when assessing rival theories, as well as at the philosophical frontier as these theories 
become more cosmic, perceptive judgment is required no less than conceptual clarity 
and factual accuracy. 
Just how good is the evidence for natural selection as the sole editing factor in 
evolution? Is the big-bang theory of the origin of the universe now more credible 
than the steady-state theory? Why did dinosaurs become extinct? Stegosaurus had 
enormous bony plates along its back, and the theory demands some survival value 
for these. But were they for defense, to make the animal appear more fierce, or to 
protect against actual attack, or cooling fins, or used in courtship, or some combina-
tion of these, or by serendipity first one and then another? Are no acquired charac-
ters ever genetically transmitted, or is there enough evidence that they sometimes 
are, as Trofim Denisovich Lysenko has maintained? Does the evidence for extrasen-
sory perception warrant further investment of research funds there? Just how simple 
is behaviorism, and is it too simple to be satisfying? Is Sigmund Freud right that 
monotheism is a projection of the father figure? Has science found causal connec-
tions often enough to demonstrate that the apparent randomness in nature is only 
apparent? Whatever psychological dimensions may operate in decisions here, there 
are also logical dimensions involved. Max Weber's thesis on the relationship be-
tween Protestantism and the rise of capitalism is a distinguished contribution to 
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social science, and it can be empirically supported, but its overall adequacy is very 
complex to assess. 
The answers come as they do to a judge appraising justice, to an ethicist gauging 
morality, to a theologian testing a religious creed—by a mingling of argument, of 
weighting of facts, of notions of plausibility, and even by intuitions that yield an 
informed judgment. Science is decision-laden; one simply cannot do it without 
grading. Further, the grading is not algorithmic. It is judgmental, and in this respect 
often draws near to the sort of grading that goes on in religion, considerably 
exceeding mere observational checking and computing therefrom. 
Observer Involvement in Science and Religion 
Against the older notions of the researcher as a mere spectator, recent science 
recognizes the observer's active contribution. The scientist selects what to study and 
how to study it. Whenever he builds laboratories, sets up experiments, isolates 
phenomena, or brings theories to direct observations, he is constructing the nets 
with which he fishes, and his catch is partly a function of his net. In every controlled 
experiment we tamper with what we observe, even the controls. These factors can 
partly be compensated for, as with the rat's differing responses to stimuli in the cage 
and in the field, but they are never eliminated. The more rigorously we probe nature, 
the more we increase this distorting manipulation. Are we creating the bizarre array 
of elementary particles that come out of our high-energy accelerators? Do they exist 
naturally or only as artifacts? Organic molecules have been artificially synthesized 
in the laboratory by passing electric discharges through selected gases, but how 
nearly does this reproduce the environment on Earth under which life might have 
originated? This is how a certain biochemical reaction proceeds in vitro, but is this 
the whole story in vivo? Existing reptiles can be shown to be less intelligent than 
mammals, but were the dinosaurs less intelligent than those earliest mammals that 
replaced them? 
To some it seems that astronomers only watch, but even the optical telescope 
selects the visible range of light as befits the eye or film, and so astronomers have 
invented instruments to discover other ranges of radiation. What they choose to 
investigate and how they interpret it in terms of their cosmological theories depends 
heavily on the manipulations accomplished in the laboratories of physics. What we 
"see" is a red shift of a spectral line (the Doppler effect), a sight already arranged 
for by a theory. What we conclude, on the basis of much further theory, is that the 
universe is expanding. Observation is always a relationship, and this does not cease 
to be true as science vastly enlarges the range of sentient experience. Whatever is 
known must come through to us in terms of perceptual equipment that we naturally 
own as this can be aided by an apparatus that we have created, in terms of cognitive 
capacities that we may think up within the parameters of our neurological structures. 
What we are looking for hooks around, often unbeknown to us, to become what we 
are looking with. So it is not merely the initial selection of a problem in which the 
scientist is involved; she remains involved in the reception of all information and 
in the ongoing construction of her instruments and theories of attack. 
The simplistic notion that science ought to be entirely a neutral discipline, 
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contrasting with the involvements of religion, distorts what we must now try to see 
more accurately—how the two fields can be brought into contrast at vital points, 
which have to do with their essential paradigms, their particular logic, and their 
extremes. But at intermediate points and in underlying rationality these contrasts 
can dissolve into similarities, though never without some insoluble residues of differ-
ence. The natural sciences deal with a dimension of experience that can be charac-
terized as empirical, while religion, beyond any account of the phenomenal world, 
deals further with a dimension that can be characterized as existential, moral, 
spiritual. Natural science can treat things as objects, while religion must reckon as 
well with subjectivity where it is present. 
In this respect the human sciences are problematic. The controversies in psy-
chology that surround a science of the mind, beyond behavioral science, show this 
tendency of science toward outwardness, and Émile Durkheim's first rule of socio-
logical method is that we must consider social facts as things to be observed like 
natural facts. So far as these sciences are empirical, they can continue to treat human 
phenomena objectively. When a psychologist, sociologist, or anthropologist wishes 
to get into the mind-sets of those studied—for indeed humans cannot be otherwise 
fully understood—what is inward has somehow, by empathic appreciation, to be laid 
out for public access. Still the social scientist is an onlooker even where he is an 
in-looker; he converts his subjects into an object of study, but he does not, qua social 
scientist, ask of himself the inner questions of subjective experience. 
Religion asks about good and evil, about guilt and redemption, about love, 
justice, and holiness, about the values of the subject in its objective world, and it 
judges these to be the ultimate or deepest ranges of experience, beside which the 
empirical explanations of the sciences are penultimate or even superficial. In the 
natural processes that the physical and biological sciences investigate, most of these 
issues do not ordinarily appear. So far as they do, as for instance when an evolutionist 
asks whether the elimination of the less fit is bad, the question cannot be solved with 
those tools with which the scientist does her empirical work, and so proves to be 
a nonscientific question. These issues can become, descriptively, subject matter for 
the social sciences, but when they do science becomes more participatory. The 
instruments of observation are empathetically constructed; a subject appraises an-
other subject, whom she treats as an object; and the results of even a supposedly 
descriptive inquiry are increasingly loaded with interpretive categories that demand 
introspective feeling for their appreciation. 
Here the scientist is a member of the class that she observes, at least generically. 
Yet a scientist proposes to work on an observable other, and to eliminate the 
consequences of her work for her own experiencing "I." This is sound methodology 
so far as it achieves universal intent by suppressing personal stakes. Though perhaps 
selecting for study what promises to be relevant and beneficial, the chemist can 
neutrally study covalent bonding, or the meteorologist cold fronts, for these are at 
much distance. But no human scientist has such remoteness from his object, for in 
the last analysis he is experimenting on himself. Psychology has psychiatry as its 
cousin; all the human sciences become helping sciences, broadly therapeutic. When 
physiology and psychology describe normal human conduct or functioning, they are 
not far from normative conduct, ethics. The line between an "is" and "ought" can 
METHODS IN SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS INQUIRY    /   21 
be drawn and ought to be drawn, but it proves semipermeable. Ethnology is never 
far from ethics; nor is human ecology. Like physicians, human scientists mix scien-
tific detachment with a deep concern for the patient. So far as there comes with 
them any concern for human welfare, they not only describe the normal but also 
expect to have relevance in normative prescriptions. Thus, science may be value-free 
at the physical end of the spectrum, but at the humanistic end it courts values it 
cannot itself provide. 
On any occasions where prescriptions are offered, some values must be superad- 
ded to empirical data, and science has moved over to the participatory level of 
religion. Reformatory elements begin to appear, and in religion reformation of the 
person is a primary goal. Religion is accordingly less hypothetical and more categori-
cal than is some science, since the latter can have less nearness, be less imperative, 
and therefore be more negotiable. Religion is thus to be trusted in, while science 
is sometimes more lightly believed. But some sciences operate in areas where convic-
tions are not tentatively held, as those find who investigate whether some races are 
lower in intelligence or who propose genetic experiments to enhance human genius. 
Science stays hard, that is, objective, proportionately as it stays empirical, and 
in all the sciences—physical, biological, and social—one can isolate out elements of 
strict science. Are there special brain centers for the emotions, others for reasoning? 
But so far as the issues are observational, they are proportionately superficial, piece-
meal bits of analysis that form technical science, technical because it is experimental 
and manipulatory. It does not demean this impressive technical element to see it 
for no more than it is and as but instrumental to deeper human concerns. In this 
technical domain scientific assertions can be put outwardly and impersonally, con-
trasting with the way that religious assertions require also inwardness and personality 
for their comprehension. 
Science becomes soft, that is, participatory and subjective, as it nears the experi-
ential beyond experimental dimensions. Are humans more emotionally driven than 
rationally guided? At length, religion is participatory in ways that science never 
reaches. How best do we use our emotional capacity to love? To what world view 
does it seem most worthwhile and reasonable to give my allegiance? Here science 
has a way of truth; religion is a way of truth. In science one knows "about" the 
object; religion removes that "about" to know with more intimacy. 
Here the judge must be up to what she judges; that is, the character conditions 
are more demanding. Aesthetic achievement or sensitivity is required of the music 
or art critic in a way not needed in the chemist or even the sociologist. Moral 
experience is required in the counselor, a sense of justice of the judge. Spiritual 
qualification is required of the theologian, involving talent at levels not demanded 
of the physicist qua physicist. Only the pure in heart can see God. Every discipline 
requires its relevant sensitivity; and learning and thinking in the biophysical arid 
social sciences, so far as they operate empirically, are simpler morally, aesthetically, 
and spiritually, however complex a causal logic may be used, than these are in 
religion. Proportionately as truths become more significant, combining cosmic with 
personal importance, they require more sensitivity for their reception. One cannot 
verify merely by painstaking observation or imaginative construction what has been 
discovered and confirmed by passion, sacrifice, faith, and suffering. This relative 
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restriction of science to empirical levels and to descriptive, technical logic partly 
explains why, among those competent to judge, there can be broader intersubjective 
agreement in science than in religion. Sometimes it even seems that the elusiveness 
of an answer is in proportion to the importance of the question! 
The danger of such sensitive involvement lies in slipping into a no-lose setup, 
where negative results prove the observer is out of tune with his object of study, 
while positive results prove that the observer is in tune with it, and right! One must 
carefully allow place for being both in tune and critical enough to hear falsity. 
Meanwhile, no one can judge with competence any enterprise with which she is not 
competently and seriously engaged, because the absolutely crucial thing about any 
scientific or theological inquiry is that it be controlled by the reality that it intends 
to study, and this demands adequate engagement with it, adequate receptivity and 
sensitivity. Religious thinkers too attempt to be "scientific," that is, systematically 
to scrutinize their beliefs for their consistency, simplicity, deployability, for ade-
quately explanatory accounts, for practicality in and congruence with experience. 
Needless to say, this requires a specific method adequate to the subject matter, and 
this cannot always be scientific in the positivistic sense but may demand instead 
considerable existential involvement. 
To be objective is not in most cases to be neutral or indifferent; nor does it 
prohibit the holding of previously gained, presently owned, presumed beliefs. Objec-
tivity requires only that one be willing and anxious to test convictions against 
experience and logic, and to reform them accordingly. Those who are prepared to 
accept such criticisms do not hold convictions subjectively, that is, only from within 
a private subjectivity. They own no bliks, but they look to be informed and reformed 
from without; they seek external involvement in correcting their judgments. We 
began this section tracing how both science and religion are, in one sense, subjective 
knowledge; we can close it by noticing that they intend also to be, in a further sense, 
objective knowledge. 
4. SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS LOGIC 
Causes and Meanings 
Science and religion share the conviction that the world is intelligible, susceptible 
to being logically understood, but they delineate this under different paradigms. In 
the cleanest cases we can say that science operates with the presumption that there 
are causes to things, religion with the presumption that there are meanings to things. 
Meanings and causes have in common a concept of order, but the type of order 
differs. "Cause" has proved a difficult notion to explicate. Some scientists have tried 
to reduce it to, or to substitute for it, bare functions between variables. But most 
scientists find it difficult to escape the conviction that the variables are efficaciously 
connected. In a stretched sense, or in loose everyday use, cause refers to any 
contributing factor in an explanation (as with Aristotle's four causes), and it may 
include deliberations, reasons, and even meanings. But in science cause is restricted 
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to outward, empirically observable constant conjunctions, attended by an elusive 
notion of necessary production of consequent results by the preceding spatiotem- 
poral events. Where causes are known, prediction is possible, and an effect is 
commonly thought explained if its causes are known, especially if it is subsumed 
under a covering law (as with gravitation, thermodynamics, or natural selection), 
that law giving a certain logic to the process. It does little explanatory work to refer 
x to the class X, and to notice that x produces y because all x's regularly produce 
y's, when we do not understand those other productions either; we have only gotten 
used to them. So law alone, although it permits deductive prediction, provides only 
the beginning of illumination, which further requires some intelligibility past regu-
larity in the relationship between cause and effect. 
"Meaning" is the perceived inner significance of something, again a murky but 
crucial notion. Occasional apprehension of meanings does not constitute a religion, 
any more than occasional recognition of causes constitutes a science. But where 
meanings are methodically detected out of a covering model, which is thought to 
represent an ultimate structure in reality, one has some sort of religion or one of its 
metaphysical cousins in philosophy. Science holds that causality runs deep in the 
nature of things; religion holds that what is highest in value runs deepest in the 
nature of things. It may be objected that one can search for meanings without being 
religious. This has not often been true historically in any broad sense, for, until the 
twentieth century, cultures, so far as they were systems of meaning, have been 
everywhere interwoven with religion. 
More recently, under the impact of science some humanists and existentialists 
have held that meaning is merely a human construct, nonreligiously selected, since 
the world itself neither offers nor bears any meaning structures. It remains to be 
seen, in view of the contemporary problem of meaninglessness, how viable these 
latter accounts are and whether any culture can be sustained on them; but here 
perhaps one has the anomaly of systematic nonreligious meaning. However, if 
meaning is thought to be given in the world structure, or to be had in dialectical 
relationship with the natural order, or to evolve as a sacred cultural emergent, then 
one has a religion, though perhaps a new immanentist or naturalistic one rather than 
a classical supernaturalistic or transcendentalist one. Relative to the distinction 
between cause and meaning, it may be said that science answers how questions and 
religion answers why questions; but these words, while suggestive, are not reliable 
indicators of syntax and the kind of explanation sought. 
Social scientists and psychologists are disagreed as to whether their sciences are 
ever sciences of meanings, and the puzzle as to how far human subjects can be 
causally understood has left the human sciences unsettled. Rigorous behaviorists 
insist that psychology is entirely a causal science, while humanistic psychologists seek 
to understand personality as a function of meaning. Social scientists find that causes 
operate in human affairs; there are causes of inflation, war, revolution, depression, 
suicide, birth and death rates, environmental crises, etc., and these causes operate 
comprehensively, including overriding or negating what the members of a society 
may mean and intend. At the same time no society is entirely understood without 
appreciating its meaning structures as these interlock with the causal factors that 
constrain it. Meaning structures too can be understood in terms of a governing 
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model out of which conduct follows. Given a certain meaning model (M), a certain 
pattern of conduct (O) will be observed (if M, then O), and thus meaning models, 
no less than causal law, can be embraced under the sort of logical inquiry we have 
here been tracing. They too have their regular operations and predictable dynamics. 
We have already maintained that creeds and theologies can be studied in this way. 
Although social scientists or psychologists may inquire what meanings other 
persons have and how these function in their lives, they do not use—the majority 
will insist—their sciences to discover meanings for themselves. These sciences may 
describe the meanings that others have, but they do not prescribe what meanings 
scientists themselves ought to have. The scientist may find meanings in his subjects 
and make these his object of study, but he does not, with his science, find meanings 
in the world structure or cultural structure and make these life-orienting. Whenever 
one undertakes this latter task, one has passed over into the province of religion and 
its cognate fields—ethics, comparative religion, the humanities, philosophy. Thus, 
in the human sciences we find an overlap between science and religion, but so far 
as there is disputed ground this is because we know what the master paradigms in 
the two fields are—that science is a study of causes and religion is an inquiry into 
meanings. 
Negotiability and Compatibility of Causes and Meanings 
Each master paradigm is virtually nonnegotiable, a dogma within that discipline. 
These paradigms arise out of experience, for the scientist has found many causal 
connections, while the saint has discovered much of significance. Such realized 
causality and meaningfulness are universalized into the beliefs that everything is 
causally sequential and that all events are meaningfully interpretable, and with this 
they become presumptions brought to experience as well as derivations from it. In 
modern science this yields a universe of precise law, which persons can successfully 
study and profitably manipulate. In modern religion this yields a universe that has 
cumulative meaningfulness, coming to focus in God, the Absolute, or a divinity of 
the natural whole. 
These dispositions to interpret things causally and also meaningfully are built 
into the deep structures of the mind, and we have to some degree an innate 
psychological drive to find things intelligible. But neither the causality found by 
science nor the significance found by religion is to be dismissed as merely psychologi-
cal, for these also are present as logical structures in the mind. The mind has evolved 
as a natural fit in response to the environment in which life occurs. What an 
individual mind brings innately to the world recapitulates the edited genetic experi-
ence of this species. 
There is some temptation to say here that causal relations are "really there," 
discovered, objective, but that meanings are invented, subjective, only "in us." A 
truth in this is that causal relations, after we have recognized how they are subject 
to our mental structures and constructions, may be outwardly reviewed for their 
constant conjunctions, while meanings appear as the subject is experientially related 
to her world. But, again subject to value structures provided by the mind, it would 
be anomalous if humans had evolved their enormous innate thirst for meaning in 
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life in a world where life is a natural event but where all these investings of life's 
relations with meaning in the world (for example, those of love and hate, fear and 
joy, birth and death, of beauty and fruitfulness, of work and parenting) were inappro-
priate and superficial. In this case all those appearances of language as it seems to 
lodge meanings in things and relationships would in fact be deceiving and refer in 
a hidden way only to the psychic state of the user of such language, a state that was 
disjoined from his biological origins. This might be so, but any argument strong 
enough to prove it is likely also to carry the implication, with Immanuel Kant, that 
causes as well as meanings are nothing but compositions of the mind. Until such 
argument prevails, it is simpler to hold that causes are experienced in the world and 
that meanings, however self-involving, are sometimes given, often relational, even 
if on occasion created ex nihilo in the mind. 
It is perhaps true that disciplined science can abstract out bare causes, devoid 
of any meaning; but this is a very sophisticated, high-level analysis, only recently 
accomplished in the intellectual life of humankind. The real world of nature and 
culture in which we live is one in which we meet facts, values, disvalues in fusion; 
they come at us together. It seems natural to say that we meet and find both causes 
and meanings there. The gut nature of living on, surviving, makes the world a field 
of values and disvalues, never neutral to the pursuit of life; and at this point it 
becomes artificial to leave by analysis the causes objectively there and wrench the 
meanings out of it as a subjective appearance or fabrication. What is given, what 
is protocol, is not naked sense data, not bare constant conjunctions, but a milieu of 
events, with causes and meanings in-mixed, sought and found, made and coming 
at us, opportunities, a world we have to move through and to evaluate. 
Can either discipline tolerate anomalies? Yes, but both will so minimize the 
exceptions that their respective gestalts still govern. A pathologist may search with-
out success across decades for the causes of a baffling disease, but she will not 
conclude that the disease is uncaused; a psychiatrist is likewise likely to insist that 
every mental disease has in fact some cause. A monotheist may admit frankly that 
he finds some events meaningless, although he also may believe that even these have 
some divine purpose, which he cannot now find. Quantum mechanics has come to 
permit the possibility that there is some genuine indeterminacy in subatomic nature. 
So far as evil prevents the assignment of meanings, its presence has always troubled 
theism. 
Randomness on the one hand and absurdity on the other do challenge these 
paradigms but are allowed only when effectively overridden by a statistical causality 
or a net meaningfulness that does not interrupt a larger intelligibility. By some 
accounts this reduces these paradigms to regulative maxims. The scientist proceeds 
in the effort to find all the causes she can; the theologian will pursue meanings as 
far as he can. Neither must then claim that her or his procedure will in every case 
be successful. But both are still prone to think of their procedures as appropriate 
because the world is constructed so as amply, if not universally, to bear relations of 
causality and of meaningfulness. 
The warfare between science and theology is often a struggle to clarify to what 
extent causal explanations are compatible with or antagonistic to meaning explana-
tions. Particular disputes may result in adjusted claims about the territory occupied 
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by each account. While no one denies that each field commands some territory of 
its own and that there is partial complementarity, are they always commensurable? 
Some kinds of causal accounts, for example, the competitive survival of the fittest, 
do seem to inhibit some kinds of meaning accounts, such as that every species was 
divinely designed at an initial, sudden creation. Some causal explanations show some 
meaning explanations to be inaccurate, inadequate, or irrelevant. But if these are 
really different tracks of explanation, how can they compete as they sometimes do? 
Science, by redescribing nature, places constraints on what concepts of God are 
credible, even though science by this redescription prescribes nothing about God's 
existence. It sets limits within which meaning accounts can work. 
Does the presence of sacred meanings in the world require any tearing in the 
weft of causes and effects, any perforation of the natural by a supernatural order? 
Does the meaning account sometimes constrain the causal, as when the experience 
of autonomy and moral responsibility seems to demand that persons be something 
more than effects predetermined by antecedent causes and stimuli? If there is 
randomness that proves causally baffling, inexplicable by science, does this imperfec-
tion correlate with the absurd in religion? Or can an account be reached whereby 
such causal looseness provides just that novelty and unfinished openness to nature 
and to life that religion can enjoy? Experience that is counted puzzling under the 
one paradigm may prove intelligible under the other. 
Differing Kinds of Logic 
The causal paradigm favors a computational logic, whether inductive or deductive 
(at least for routine science, though perhaps not for revolutionary science), while the 
meaning paradigm involves an intelligibility that is more holistic. Causes go into 
linear networks, which often permit a quantifying theoretical overlay measuring with 
numbers such things as wavelengths and stimulus-response correlations, although we 
should not forget that those numbers, which look so accurate and objective, even 
with their margins of error, are in the case of scientific measurement always the 
product of a theoretical overlay on nature and never purely natural computations 
at all. The validity of such quantifying depends on the quality of the overlay. 
Even nonmetric science is prone to taxonomic serial catalogs and phylogenetic 
chains, the steps of which can be isolated for analysis. This brings a particular 
occurrence or individual under a covering law or type. Such repeatability and 
parallelism are not always found or verified by either induction or deduction, and 
just what counts as patterns similar enough to warrant their inclusion under the same 
law is always a matter of some discretion. But the causal character presumed here 
sometimes permits to science a level of rationality and thus of testability different 
from that in religion, a step-by-step checking that can be summed up into 
near-compulsory argument. 
Religious meanings are not integrative in this scalar way. When set in their 
gestalt, the particulars give rise to meaning. In detecting more sophisticated pat-
terns, as when, despite her aging, we recognize the face of a friend whom we have 
not seen for decades, there is a subtle interplay of textural features by which the 
whole is constituted. This sort of logic is present in science when a geologist 
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recognizes the facies of rock strata, or when a dendrologist notices the differences 
between the bark of spruce and that of fir. But it looms much larger as one 
approaches the perception of meaning in a novel, such as Gone with the Wind, or 
in a historical career, as of Abraham Lincoln. One must join earlier and later 
significances in ways more qualitative than quantitative, more dramatic than linear. 
The sense of scenic scope is more crucial than that of incremental detail, hence the 
nonmetric character of religion. 
Pattern statements differ from detail statements, alike in science and religion, 
but in some science it is easier to go from detail statements to pattern statements, 
owing to the metric-causal character. The holographic character of meaning models 
is not merely sequential with the chronology of life but requires more cross-play and 
interweaving, a logical network sometimes said to be more characteristic of the right 
than of the left cerebral hemisphere, more characteristic of the brain in general than 
of a computer. But this remains in the if-then mode, for even in the analysis of 
gestalts one says such things, to recall the reversible drawing, as "If that is a young 
woman, then this is a necklace and that an ear. But if it is a hag, then this is a mouth 
and that an eye." 
The finding of meanings is not as simple as is identifying unvarying conjunctions. 
Those unique, nonrepeatable factors present in each occasion can often be inte-
grated into its meaningfulness, while in subsuming an event under causal law these 
are irrelevant. The Victory of Samothrace instances certain universal forms of grace, 
strength, and flair, found also in other great sculptures. However, its aesthetic value 
is not constituted in abstracting these but rather just as these are indissolubly 
particularized in the individual integrity of one historical statue. There are recurrent 
religious meanings, as when persons rediscover the significance of forgiveness or of 
sacrificial love, but each occasion instantiating this will be cherished not only for its 
generality but also for its particularity. 
There are various modes of interest of the human mind, not all of them either 
scientific or religious. Science and religion share a theoretical mode of interest. Both 
want to operate out of a model or theory, a plot or a pattern, that gives a universal 
intelligibility to what is observed in particular episodes. But science has little interest 
in particulars for their particularity after they have been included as instances of a 
universal type. It has little interest, for instance, in proper names as essential to its 
content. But religion retains its interest in particulars both for their constitutive 
power in enriching the universal model and as loci of value. It is thus full of proper 
names, no less than of creedal models. 
Because of this inclusion of particulars in the composition of meanings, religion 
can tolerate the presence of surprise more than can science. The history of science 
is beset with surprises, of course. But real surprises are quite upsetting to prevailing 
theory, for scientific models must be specifically extensible in advance to all forth-
coming phenomena, and any incapacity to predict is unnerving. Religion is less 
inclined to predict, less insistent on similarity of cases; rather, it waits to see, after 
the fact, whether its paradigm can extend to cover these surprises, whether if the 
theory is true then a novel observation can be seen by retrodiction to follow from 
it. Neither the causal flow nor the meaning flow is reversible in fact. Yet causal 
accounts are projectable in thought symmetrically forward and backward (remem- 
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bering, however, the logically troublesome status of induction). The admission of 
the singular existent implies that a meaning account cannot always, on the basis of 
recalled experience, limit its expectations as to what will and will not be absorbable 
into its creeds. In this sense a religious theory has an openness beside which a 
scientific theory is closed. 
One does not always have to say in advance exactly what would refute one's 
theory, for that requires too much prophetic power; but one must be willing to 
examine each new bit of evidence as it comes along with widening ranges of human 
experience. A Christian judges Jesus, the Christ, to be the key to meaningful life 
in the world by perceiving in him the normative expression of a life style of agape. 
The claim follows that the agape life will always be found meaningful, but one is 
not able to say, in prospect, just what will count as a context for agape. Such contexts 
are too idiographic, although one can say, in retrospect, whether those meanings 
launched in Jesus have been continued as embodied in the historical particularity 
of each disciple's life. Here one has to judge the cumulative effect of severally 
inconclusive and partial verifications, which are woven not to prove but to corrobo-
rate a creed. 
One can deduce only in a looser logic of weak connections. One can know out 
of his theory something of the possibilities that the future may hold, but he cannot 
make the watertight predictions that a positivist will insist that the hypothetico- 
deductive model requires. But to know, out of one's theory, something of the 
possibilities is already to know something, just as to know probabilities is already to 
know much, although it is not to know everything. Neither science nor religion 
arrives at certainties. They at best predict probabilities, but religion is looser here 
than is science and often can predict only a range of possibilities. Still, there is a 
logic to it, a model out of which one can derive the oncoming particulars and a 
symbolic system that functions as a regulatory model, albeit a noncausal one, into 
which the events of life are fitted (composing and recomposing this creed) and out 
of which they are interpreted. 
Thus, the hypothetico-deductive method in religion does not employ the nar-
rower sense of "deduce" that science sometimes uses. Although a new event cannot 
be entirely foreseen from the theory, that event, when it does occur, does follow and 
unfold from the theory, while some other events may not. From the first half of a 
play we cannot predict just how the second half will proceed, although as it proceeds 
we have a gathering sense of how the several events fit into an overall plot. We 
reason back down from the general to the particular, more broadly deriving from 
the paradigmatic plot what episodes may be allowed to constitute it. Thus, the 
dramatic plot is testable against unfolding experience. But this testability is not a 
stringent one. There is no single logically necessary deduction from what has gone 
before, although certain events can, and others cannot, be significantly emplaced in 
the scheme. Even in science this may occur, as in evolutionary theory, where later 
specific developments in their novelty cannot be unequivocably forecast, although 
after they occur they may be examined as to whether they are consistent with the 
theory. 
Given that science remains causal, leaving off any assignment of meanings, it 
is a value-free enterprise, while religion is a valuational one. This is not a simple 
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matter, however, because there is a spectrum of meanings attached to value and to 
neutrality. Science, as we have noticed, shares certain pervasive values with religion, 
such as those of truth and critical inquiry. In science one makes judgments about 
good instruments or research. One operates on the presumption that science itself 
is good, either instrumentally or intrinsically or both. But where science is confined 
to causal accounts, it never prescribes life values, for these lie in the realm of 
meanings. 
Science is not, as is sometimes thought, merely instrumental to value, for intrin-
sic science does redescribe the world for us. The descriptions here cannot be ignored, 
for such discoveries as the age and extent of the universe, the evolution of life and 
its biochemical nature, the human neurophysiological structures, or the electronic 
character of matter have forced theology to reform earlier accounts of meanings. 
Persons always shape their values in some correspondence with what they believe 
the world to be actually like. But these descriptions never constitute prescriptions, 
however much they may force a reconstituting of them. In this sense religion is fully 
operational, completely functional in joining theory with practice, as science is not, 
for religion has its own value setup, which permits the translation of principles into 
conduct, while any scientific system is parasitic on some value system before it can 
become operational in life. Religion, however, is not so operational that it can ignore 
what science reveals about the character of the world and of life. 
An older form of this claim is that science seeks knowledge, but the spiritual 
quest is for wisdom.19 Knowledge and wisdom are neither coextensive nor mutually 
exclusive, but they overlap. In part, but only in part, a person remains naive and 
unwise until she has integrated the best available knowledge from the current 
sciences into her world view. Still, such knowledge is not sufficient for wisdom, for 
no accumulation of causal explanations can ever produce the significance of a thing. 
The latter comes at another level of insight. In this sense, science explains but 
religion reveals; science informs, but religion reforms. 
It is often said that science operates in an I-It mode, that of experience, while 
religion proceeds in dialogical encounter, the I-Thou mode. This distinction is 
founded on the biting difference, noticed daily, between dealing with persons and 
things.20 This dichotomy recognizes the outward objectivity of science, where an 
"I" describes "things" in their causal relations and manipulates them as a result. In 
religion this "operational I" is replaced by a "relational I" that answers to the world 
and constitutes meanings in exchange with it. Demands flow to the "I" as well as 
proceed from it, for the existential "I" is called forth by that which is known. The 
subject has gone out to its object, which is no longer bare object, but is itself a 
subject, that is, a source of prescription to me. Wisdom appears in this intersubjec- 
tive encounter, while the objective mode can provide only descriptive knowledge. 
So the notion of subjectivity loses some of its unwanted flavor, and the word 
"operational," often favorably linked with objectivity, becomes annoying so far as 
it is manipulative. The unilateral operator is ill fitted to hear the address of another 
or to respond to its worth. 
Monotheism, moreover, detects the divine as a depth presence, an "Eternal 
Thou" in, with, and beyond the sacramental, superficial objectivity of the phenome-
nal world. This detection is comprehensively extended from the way in which we 
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detect other minds in the behavior of human bodies. That sense of divine address 
is more elusively present in Eastern religions, but what is present is a depth engage-
ment of the sacred so gripping as to draw forth the entire person, a meeting of the 
world at its inciting ground such that the whole self is called to respond, nearer like 
my relation with a "Thou" than with an "It." Further, though, theism and monism 
aside, meanings may arise where we attach no "Thou-hood" to this gripping other, 
as in encounters with nature or in aesthetics. 
Some accounts find religion to be less linguistic and thus less logical than science. 
This may be taken by critics as a vice, but it also may be taken by proponents as 
a virtue, that religion plunges to deeper levels than the conventional ones of science. 
This latter position is not without merit, for the religious object, God, if it exists, 
is incomparably greater than any routine scientific object, such as rocks, fish, or 
atoms. Logic and language may have evolved, and be evolving, best to fit the 
mundane, phenomenal world, and they may ill fit the transmundane, noumenal 
world. Sometimes in the West and often in the East, mystics cultivate noncognitive 
states supposed to transcend all logic and language. 
We do not need entirely to dismiss such claims to recognize that nevertheless 
logic and language enter steadily and decisively into religion, just as fully as they do 
into science. Interpersonal Thou relationships are hardly less linguistic than experi-
ences of an It; if anything, they are more so. The discovery of meanings, which 
humanizes us, requires language no less than the discovery of causes. If meanings 
are more resistant to language than are causes, if they have nonverbal dimensions, 
that may indicate that the intelligibility that religion seeks requires a richer logic 
than the scientific sort. If all created things derive an intelligibility from their 
Creator, then the phenomenal world is a product of the noumenal Logos and 
sacramentally points to it. The prescription of values takes more, not less, thinking 
than does the description of events. Possibly our religion outruns our rational capaci-
ties further than does science, but, whatever consequently is the place occupied by 
mystical moments, these do not constitute the whole of religion; nor can they stand 
alone. All the classical faiths have their speechless moments, but they all have their 
supporting scriptures, creeds, arguments, and education. 
The immediate experience of God, Brahman, or nirvāna always proves on 
examination to be quite as theory-laden as are any of the protocol data of the 
sciences. This does not disparage the intensity or firsthand directness of such experi-
ence; it only insists that there is a logic that leads up to and unfolds out of it. In 
this sense "God," "Brahman," and "nirvāna" are postulates, inferential theoretical 
entities used to explain what underlies the world and certain marvelous encounters 
had within it. The personalness in religion does not prevent its being logical. 
It is logically and empirically possible that religious knowledge would come by 
occasional interruption of an otherwise regular world order, by fluke and visitation, 
unprecedented, unrepeatable, not amenable to methodological study of even the 
theological sort, much less the scientific sort, proposed here. This could be not only 
in the context of discovery, which could well be nonpredictable, charismatic, muta- 
tional, revelational, but even in the context of verification. Revelation, miracles, 
oracles once confirmed could never again be reconfirmed, but would ever after have 
to be taken on sheer faith. But this would be an odd sort of knowledge, one that 
had no carry-forward features, with no way it could be shown to be true, reasonable, 
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probable, repeatable in experience. Such knowledge would be just true, inserted once 
for all into historical time. Whatever elements of this kind one can find in the 
classical religions, those faiths have also claimed that their truths could, in some 
measure, be verified in life, tested out in each new generation, seen to work again 
and again, despite the once-for-all character of the launching visitation. 
Self-implicating Meanings 
Meanings are always self-implicating. Values are by definition those things that 
make a difference. This might be thought to bias a person's capacities for logic in 
religion. One cannot think clearly about what one is wrapped up in. But the other 
side of this is that one will not think at all about that for which one does not care, 
or rightly think about that for which one does not rightly care. This caring becomes 
more self-reforming as the inquiry passes from the scientific to the humanistic to 
the religious. The task of religion is to examine that self in its relationships with the 
world, unmasking illusions and false cares, reforming it from self-centeredness, 
centering it on that which is of ultimate worth. This is worship, produced out of 
and returning to reflection. This worship, conceived as the self's disengagement 
from private concerns and engagement with the absolute, is precisely that universal 
intent that makes logic possible. Only such enthusiasm, or divine inspiriting, can get 
the self off-centered enough to reason aright. 
The religious judgment is that the self must be reformed in order to eliminate 
its tendency toward rationalizing, and it is just this positive combination of worship 
and reflection that makes possible an unbiased rationality. Religion shares with 
science then a concern for objective rationality, only it knows far better than science 
that the path to true objectivity lies through subjective reformation. This passion 
makes for genius. Religion is the science of the spirit, where a rationality suited for 
objects is inadequate. Here the reflective scientist will not say that he comes to 
nature without assumptions, despising the theologian as being overcome with them. 
But he will see that, so far as his selection employs empirical causation as his fishing 
net, he has a different set of assumptions; and he may even wonder whether just 
these assumptions might prevent him from receiving the data of religion in an 
undistorted form. 
Perhaps some will complain that the account here has dealt too much with 
religion as a means of copying reality, with correspondence in truth, and too little 
with religion as a means of coping with reality, with its instrumental functions in 
life. So we readily grant that religion is a means of coping. But that is just as true 
of science, which is driven by the need to cope with reality not less than to copy 
it. Like different sorts of maps, both help us to get around in the world (supply a 
"method") because each in its own way represents that world ("follows after it") 
more or less faithfully. 
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